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Abstract: 
In this paper I analyse and problematise what I argue are the dominant modes of 
liberated subject formation performed through divergent modes of organising within 
two anarchist social centres in Bristol, UK. Drawing on practical examples, I show 
how practices oriented to equality, like consensus decision-making and more 
formalised and codified modes of conduct, perform and presuppose a conception of 
freedom as coextensive with the attainment of rational subjectivity. In order to 
participate, to consent and to practice the self-limitation required to safeguard the 
freedom of others, sovereignty over the self is required - reason must outweigh 
desire. Yet as the activist subject defers pleasure for the sake of others, the practice of 
freedom comes to feel more like moral duty. Participation is at once the marker of 
freedom yet enacted out of an obligation that is as oppressive to anarchists as it is 
patronising to the mythical community we/they try to attract. Arising in opposition 
to the felt oppression of these practices, I identify a set of more spontaneous, joyful 
and less codified (anti-)organisational forms. Against the duty-bound activism of the 
rational activist, this counter-current embraces a conception of personal freedom as 
the liberation of desire. While this approach creatively counters the ‘martyrdom’ of 
the activist to the collective cause, it risks a moral solipsism that is equally 
unacceptable to anarchists. Whether possessed of own desire or rational will, 
freedom, in both sets of practices, is seen as coextensive with sovereignty over the 







Introduction: Freedom and Equality in Tension 
 
As a prefigurative praxis that aspires to freedom with equality, the anarchism of 
contemporary anarchist social centres is constituted by a tension between personal 
liberation in the present and the ‘long haul’ and delayed gratification of struggle for 
collective emancipation. Often we get this balance wrong – giving up the things that 
nourish us for an infinitely demanding activism, or, conversely, emphasising self-
care to the extent that the egalitarian character of anarchist praxis is difficult to 
identify. 
The problem of personal versus collective liberation has a rich genealogy in anarchist 
praxis. It is evidenced in print, perhaps most strikingly in the acerbic debate between 
self-titled ‘social anarchists’ (see, for example, Bookchin 1995), and the individualist 
and ‘post-leftist’ anarchisms of Bey (1991), Black (1997), CrimethInc (2001, 2008) and 
Euro-American insurrectionism (see, 325 Magazine, Fire to the Prisons). While 
contemporary anarchist practices tend to incorporate both of these tendencies (Davis 
2010; Graeber 2009) the division should not be glossed over. At the root of this split 
are two very different conceptions of liberated subjectivity which are performed 
through quite different practices. For ‘social’ anarchism the liberated subject is a 
rational one, moved by an analysis of social injustice to create equality in the present. 
Conversely for or ‘post-leftist’ anarchisms, critical as they are of the modernist 
instrumentalism enrolled in social anarchism’s rational subject, the subject is one of 
liberated desire. Both, imply not only the possibility but the desirability of unitary, 
sovereign subjectivity and in so doing counterpoise freedom to equality. The 
sovereign subject, like that of liberalism, requires universal moral law or innate 
benevolence to guide egalitarian conduct. Egalitarian conduct is thus rendered either 
duty or automatic response, rooted in essentialist claims about what it means to be 
human. Neither configuration, in their inherent restrictiveness, are acceptable to 
anarchists. Freedom and equality cannot be separated. 
Of course, anarchism has long advocated an inextricability of freedom from equality 
– from Bakunin’s 1866 maxim that until all are free, none are free, right through to 
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Todd May’s anarchist reading of Ranciere that positions the enactment of the 
presupposition of the equality of all as central to the practice of freedom. But theory 
does not always translate neatly into practice. In this paper I draw on a four-year 
autoethnographic engagement with two anarchist social centres in Bristol, England 
to show how personal freedom or collective equality tend to take precedence in 
practice. I do this through an exploration of what I argue are the dominant modes of 
emancipated subjectivity enacted at these sites and expressed, cultivated and 
reinscribed through the texts (zines, posters and critiques) in circulation, which in 
turn constitute partial scripts on which performances of subjectivity draw. On the 
one hand, modes of self or group discipline that facilitate more egalitarian 
relationships tend to perform a rational subject, yet simultaneously, risk a 
‘martyrdom’ of that subject to the collective cause. On the other, practices that are 
explicitly critical of the ‘duty-bound’ activist, perform a subject of liberated desire yet 
lack egalitarian potential. Meanwhile, the presupposition that either form of freedom 
is universally desirable is itself oppressive, or at the very least confusing, to those 
who do not share it. Crucially, neither space can be boxed neatly into the reductive 
frames of either ‘post-leftist’ or ‘social’ anarchisms. While each exhibits tendencies 
which privilege either freedom or equality, modes of subjectivity performed and 
presupposed by the practices and discourses that co-constitute these spaces are 
contradictory and incomplete – desiring and rational subjectivities are performed at 
both sites and by individuals. 
Following Foucault, I understand subjectivity here not as innate or ‘transcendental’ 
but rather produced or cultivated through particular power-laden discourses and 
practices. Subjectivity is that category or mode of being that an individual inhabits in 
a particular historically contingent context. Thus ‘worker’, ‘woman’, ‘activist’ are 
modes of subjectivity – they are categories of being that individuals are invited to 
fulfil, and which individuals participate in the fulfilment of - they are relational, 
entail particular capacities and limitations and are rooted in specific cultural, ethnic 
and historical trajectories/genealogies. Conceptions of subjectivity and in particular, 
liberated subjectivity are important for anarchists –  they govern what it is to have 
agency, to be a ‘free’ or ‘oppressed’, and themselves can entail forms of oppression. 
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My central agument is that the intractability of the individual/social tension emerges 
from the tendency within these opposing paradigms to conceptualise the human 
subject as essentially sovereign: human freedom is regarded as coextensive with 
access, either to the sovereign will or ‘own’ desire. If the liberated subject is 
sovereign, then power remains its ‘constitutive outside’. This turns those practices of 
self-discipline, that are necessary to create equality, into modes of self-oppression. 
Meanwhile, those practices of self-care, necessary for freedom to be prefigurative, 
become a form of narcissism. If anarchist practices are to avoid ‘martyrdom’ in 
pursuit of equality, and narcissism in pursuit of freedom, the concept of sovereignty 
over the self must be abandoned.  
The Sites: 
Kebele 
 Kebele is Bristol’s, and indeed one of the UK’s, longest-running anarchist social 
centres. The building was squatted in 1994 amidst the multitude of networked, 
spectacular and creative modes of resistance that formed a particular formative 
moment in UK ‘DIY culture’ (McKay 1998). Originally squatted, participants were 
able to buy the space after a resisted eviction provided just enough time to form a 
cooperative, secure a loan from Radical Routes and fundraise for a deposit. 
Residential spaces helped pay the mortgage and the building is now owned outright 
by the Kebele Community Cooperative. Kebele offers a multitude of activities and 
‘DIY services’ including a bike workshop, debtors alliance, a weekly vegan café, 
radical library and infoshop as well as classes and ‘skillshares’ from yoga and 
languages to tools and tactics for radical organising. The space is well used as a 
meeting and events space by the Kebele Cooperative as well as a variety groups 
working on issues from migration struggles and prisoner solidarity to environmental 
direct action and animal rights.  
With the longevity of the project longevity, its ethos is well established, having been 
thought, collectively deliberated upon, codified and revised by successive waves of 
participants. Explicitly stated “core principles”, include broad values including 
equality, non-hierarchy, mutual aid and not-for-profit as well as the practical 
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commitment to put these into action through collective decision-making and 
organisation, openness and inclusion and shared responsibility. These “principles” 
according to Kebele’s website 
"reflect the sort of world […] members want to see and help bring into reality. 
It is these principles which make Kebele a radical social centre. Instead of 
waiting for that ever far away big moment of revolution, or for leaders and 
authorities to sort out our problems, we recognise that we can make 
fundamental changes here and now, in the ways we organise, communicate, 
interact and take action". 
Over time established norms developed that govern how things from cooking in the 
café to making decisions collectively should best be done. Though there to promote 
‘best’ practice and to guard against the subtle emergence of hierarchy, this fixing of 
procedures, particularly in a relatively formal mode of consensus decision-making 
could feel stifling to participants, new and old. 
"When Kebele started there were a lot of transient types about, travellers, 
festival people, people from the road protest movement. They’d stay a bit and 
put a lot of effort in and then move on, and then they’d come back later with 
a kid, dogs looking for a place to crash. That was really the vibe of the space. 
On a Sunday people would be playing guitars, mandolin, drumming… it was 
tribal. As time went on, rules got made and sort of policies got put in place by 
the people who stuck around. When those on the move came back they’d 
often react badly - like as if a principle of freedom has been undermined. 
Gradually those transient types came less and less” NJ from Feildnotes 19 
In addition to abiding collectively-imposed rules, managing a permanent space also 
includes certain mundane and un-glamorous tasks like paying council tax, insurance, 
electricity and water, dealing with licensing authorities and preparation for the 
dreaded health and safety inspection. More often than not, such tasks fall on a small 
group of individuals – those who ‘stuck around’ – and who commonly feel both 
committed and burdened by the often invisible work of just keeping the space 
running. Whilst permanence brings a degree of autonomy in a movement where 
projects must usually choose between transience and rent, it brings other binds both 
personal and collective. Security seems to comes at a price: normalization and 
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bureaucracy – a combination that can exhaust the savings of even the most die-hard 
self-defining ‘activist’. 
The Factory 
The Factory similarly emerged from a period of high intensity transient political 
performances, but much more recent ones. In early 2008 a group of squatters, of 
which I was one, came together in response to an international ‘call-out’ for the 
defense of squats and autonomous spaces. Taking action under the name, ‘Bristol 
Space Invaders’ (BSI), this new collective created a number of temporary spectacular 
squatted event-spaces tied in with local struggles from gentrification to climate 
change, militarism and animal rights combining a potent mix of art, performance, 
protest, pedagogy and entertainment alongside incomplete glimpses of the kind of 
social relations we to wished to universalize. Despite apparent success, by late 2009 
BSI were already becoming critical precisely of the temporary and spectacular 
character of these interventions.  We longed to create something both more durable 
and more ‘relevant’ to a mythical local community we believed to exist just beyond 
reach. Many of us felt a sense of exhaustion with the life-rhythm of intense effort 
towards momentary events only to disassemble our work (time permitting) before 
eviction and then spending the following months either recovering or planning for 
‘the next big thing’. Perversely, in our attempt to celebrate the present, we ended up 
living for the future. In early 2010 in a bid to enact a more personally sustainable and 
locally connected creative resistance, we occupied 2-8 Cave Street, a derelict 
Edwardian Shoe Factory in St Pauls, Bristol with the intention of creating a new 
anarchist social centre, one along the lines of Kebele, but retaining, we hoped, the 
spontaneity and fun of our previous temporary endeavours. The ‘The Factory’ social 
centre was born. 
With the building in a state of total disrepair the first six months consisted almost 
entirely of building and repair; pluming, electrics, roofing, windows, floors, walls 
and rooms to house seventeen participant-residents. This material struggle was in 
many ways the easy part – physically tough yet manifestly straightforward: it was 
clear what needed to be done and the effects of doing it were immediate. Tasks like 
painting a wall could be easily handed over from one volunteer to another without 
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exhaustive instructions. This was a far cry from the complex work that always 
remained ‘to come’ – that of making links with neighbours and local groups who for 
one reason or another we thought should want to use the space. 
Equally complex was the creation of a process for living together in accordance with 
the desire for a world free from domination – or more often than not, managing the 
fall-out from our lack of one. Our prior experience of collective working produced a 
rather different flavour of autonomous organising to that enacted at Kebele. Though 
we did operate a consensus decision-making model, it tended toward informality in 
an attempt to facilitate spontaneity and avoid the perceived ‘over-organising’ and 
even boredom that some associated with Kebele. Informality gave a life and frivolity 
to meetings, maintaining to some extent the creative spark of our previous collective 
experiences, but did not always guard against the subtle emergence of informal 
hierarchy or ensure that everything that needed to got done. The Factory’s 
prefigurative character seemed to lie beyond the formalisation of ‘process’, existing 
instead in the informality of living differently, collectively; finding and sharing food, 
cooking, breaking and building together to create our dreams as well as picking 
them apart over a bottle of booze. 
Meanwhile, the Police, Fire Service and Local Council in different ways all put up 
resistance. These ranged from the threat of eviction on the grounds of a ‘duty of care’ 
for fire safety, to more explicit intimidation and surveillance punctuated by the 
erection of a CCTV camera pointed at the front door after the UK-wide riots in 
August 2011. These external threats, culminating in the purchase of the building by 
Christian development company, PG Group, in September 2011, seemed to force the 
closing of doors as we mobilized selves to resist. As we built barricades we 
undoubtedly felt closer to each other but so much further from the mythical others 
we initially sought to attract. With the eviction in November 2011 and the building 
now lost, our goal of retaining the spontaneity and creativity of our temporary 
events in a lasting project, without simultaneously producing new oppressive 
regimes of self-government remains an unrealised, perhaps impossible demand. 
 




Facilitator: OK, so I see a few new faces so maybe we should just quickly run over the 
process we use here? [nods of agreement – one or two participants wave their hands, 
palms facing outwards in apparent silent applause] So basically, if you have a point 
to make raise one hand like this’ [raises one hand with a single finger extended] and if 
you have an urgent point – a direct response to whatever was just said - then you 
raise two hands – but it has to be really urgent and relevant as you’re jumping the 
queue. Use it sparingly. OK, so yeah, if someone makes a proposal and you agree with 
it you can do this [waves hands palms facing the group] and if you disagree you can 
do this [waves hands palms down facing the knees]. I know it looks a bit weird but it’s 
just to avoid things getting agreed on the basis of who shouts loudest – so that we can 
see we’re all part of whatever decision we’re making. So, is everyone OK with that? [a 
few people wave their hands as demonstrated] Is everyone OK with that? [Approx. 
90% wave hands] Is everyone OK with that? [Smiling. The final stragglers 
somewhat self-consciously give a limp wave of the hands along with everyone else] 
Cool – let’s start then.  
(Fieldnotes, Kebele, March 2012) 
Consensus decision-making process as introduced briefly here, whether employed 
more or less formally, is a technique for maximising participation in the decisions 
that affect the life of the participant, and by extension, the group. Consensus process 
occupies normative status at Kebele, The Factory, and in many anarchist and non-
hierarchical collectivities (CrimethInc 2012; Graeber 2009: 321; Lance 2005; Wilson 
2014). In a consensus process, participation is constituted by giving or withdrawing 
consent in the context of a given decision, as well as in the prior deliberative 
practices of shaping a proposals on which a decisions must be taken (Lance 2005). In 
maximising authorship in the decisions that affect their lives, participants aspire to 
minimize the likelihood of domination by one over another since it is presumed that 
freely-acting subjects will not consent to be dominated.  
Though consensus process is relatively new to anarchist organising1 co-emerging 
with contemporary anarchism in the later half of the 20th Century (Cornell 2009; 
                                                     
1  While consensus process is relatively new to western political organising, forms of 
consensus decision-making have been used by a variety of non-western societies for many 
thousands of years. For a more detailed account of consensus-process in non-western 
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Gordon 2008; Maeckelbergh 2011; Wilson 2014), anarchists have long-favoured 
directly democratic organisational forms and criticised political representation. 
Proudhon referred to representation as ‘subterfuge’ while Bakunin called it ‘an 
immense fraud’ (Cohn 2003: 54). As May argues, 
for anarchists representation signifies the delegation of power from one 
group or individual to another, and with that delegation comes the risk of 
exploitation by the group or individual to whom power has been ceded (1994; 
47). 
But it is not only the risk of exploitation under delegated power that anarchists find 
problematic. The act of ‘being spoken for’ is regarded as a certain ‘indignity’ in and 
of itself (ibid; Heckert 2012). To the extent that representative systems limit the ability 
of an individual to actively consent to decisions that affect them, they are regarded as 
inherently less liberatory, even if practiced without ‘abuse’. In addition to being anti-
representative, consensus processes are also anti-majoritarian. In smaller 
autonomous groups like Kebele and the Factory, majority rule is an absolute last 
resort, and one that I never experienced the use of. Just as all are able to exert their 
say on the shape of a decision, all participants have effective veto. That veto is only 
to be used sparingly – in theory, only when the decision, in the view of the 
participant, threatens to contradict the group’s shared aims; the pre-existing 
consensus on which the democratic procedure is based.  In large-scale consensus 
processes like Occupy where shared aims were less clear and/or norms around the 
minimal use of veto may be less well established, ‘super majorities’ of eighty to 
ninety-five per cent have been used (Graeber 2013: 212) to avoid the use of the veto 
by small minorities understood to be ‘derailing’ the process.  
Whether unanimous or by super-majority, decision-making through consensus 
process, is radically participatory in comparison to representative and simple 
majority democratic procedures. It is thus understood not only as liberating – as a 
mode of empowerment (Gordon 2007) – but also radically egalitarian – as a ‘process 
of continuously decentralizing power’ (Maeckelbergh 2011: 10). Where practiced 
                                                                                                                                                        




skilfully, it protects the will of the one from rule by the many and the will of the 
many from rule by the one. 
In order to engage in consensus process ‘skilfully’, it is necessary to know oneself – at 
least to know one’s own ‘will’ – to know the rules of the decision-making procedure 
and to work on oneself in particular ways. It is the responsibility of the subject to 
perform self-discipline by withholding veto unless shared aims are threatened, and 
to know when and how to use that veto in order to challenge proposals that do 
threaten shared aims. In this context the participant who is able to master articulate 
speech and able to remember often complex and convoluted arguments, points and 
proposals will be able to participate more fully than those less able to do so. To 
participate in consensus – which in anarchist contexts is to be free – is premised on, 
and performative of a particular mode of ethical subjectivity: the responsible, self-
disciplined, reflective, rational subject.   
This bears a striking resemblance to the subject presupposed and cultivated by 
neoliberal governmentalities. Governmentality similarly invites subjects to 
participate, to be free where freedom entails the performance of responsibility, 
rational decision-making and self-discipline, which in turn enables a withdrawal of 
responsibility by the state in particular spheres of social life. Of course, anarchists 
desire not only the withdrawal of the state from the social sphere (for this alone 
facilitates its strengthening as resources are redirected into the security apparatus) 
but its abolition. The anarchist cultivation of self-disciplined, autonomous subjects is, 
we might argue, precisely an illiberal project to the extent that it facilitates the 
abolition of the representative citizen-state relationship. Neoliberalism then should 
not been seen as having a monopoly on self-government – it is not the sole mode of 
governmentality (Appadurai 2001; Kesby 2005). 
While anarchist and neoliberal governmentalities must be differentiated, anarchism 
as performed through consensus, is nonetheless a mode of governing through 
freedom - participation is premised on the performance of a particular mode of 
subjectivity and anarchist spaces are replete with tacit rules governing proper 
conduct (Wilson 2014) and regulating who may and may not enter (Ince 2012). As 
Sharma argues,  
11 
 
Both counterhegemonic and hegemonic uses of empowerment are, following 
Foucault (1991), governmental, in that they aim to produce aware and active 
citizen-subjects who participate in the project of governance to mold their 
behaviour toward certain ends (Sharma 2009: 3). 
Counter-governmentalities are still governmentalities (Larner 2009: 4; Li 2007: 275). 
Moreover, though anarchism strives to enact an illiberal politics, it is not immune 
from the slip to liberal modes of subjectivity. The ethical subjects consensus 
processes call forth risk such a slippage. Like Kantian subjectivity that underpins 
liberal thought, ethical conduct in consensus process is premised on accessing and 
acting upon the rational will. For Kant, as for many anarchists, in order for the 
individual to be truly ‘autonomous’ she must decide the rules by which she lives in 
the absence of external influence (Newman 2003). Reflecting rationally within a 
particular situation, the Kantian subject is able to access universal moral laws, since 
rationality is presupposed to be universal and morality is presupposed to be rational. 
This neat procedure seemingly provides the subject with an ethics in the absence of 
authority. Herein resides the anti-authoritarian character of enlightenment thought 
as well as its attraction for anarchists. But if rationality is universal and already-
embedded within the subject, then humans are free but only to make the rational 
choice. As postcolonial and anti-racist scholars have argued, Western rationality, far 
from being universally embedded in all human beings, is a specific ethnophilosophy 
that emerges in ‘a particular historical location marked by gender, race, class, region 
and so on’ (Sandoval 2000: 8). The autonomous rational subject is white, western and 
male. Moreover, this liberal subject has only been made possible through the violent 
exclusion of other forms of subjectivity (such as ‘madness’) that deviate from this 
ideal (Foucault 1977). While the Kantian subject may initially be attractive to 
anarchists in providing a route to ethics in the absence of ‘external’ authority, it can 
engender precisely the authoritarianism it seeks to elide. 
So what do we do? Consensus process arises from a valid critique of representative 
and majoritarian decision-making procedures. Would an irrational democratic 
procedure be somehow more liberating?  Bookchin's (1995) derision of individualist 
and post-leftist anarchisms, and of Foucault’s work (p. 10), mistakenly equates the 
critique of instrumental reason with a proposal for mysticism and heresy. Bookchin 
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takes the critique of a specific mode of rationality, its dominance and power effects, 
as a critique of rationality itself. Foucault regarded this imperative to either accept 
rationality or fall prey to the irrational as a certain ‘blackmail’ that ‘operates as 
though a rational critique of rationality were impossible’ (Foucault 1988: 27). My 
concern here is with the work that the concept of freedom as coextensive with 
rationality does in the context of two social centres. This need not imply the abolition 
of rationality – simply, a more careful and reflexive approach to the way in which it 
is mobilised and an attentiveness to its power effects. 
‘Shall we just start without them?’ 
(Participant, start of a Kebele Meeting, November 2009) 
In a group framed by the valorisation of freedom with equality, participation in 
decision-making, as the manifestation of rational subjectivity, becomes normatively 
coded as ‘good’. Participation is freedom-with-equality and freedom-with-equality is 
desirable/good. Accordingly, in cases of minimal turnout for decision-making 
regarding the space, there commonly results a sense of disbelief that others do not 
desire participation. This is paired with a paradoxical sense in which those present 
are shouldering a level of decision-making experienced as oppressive. There is a felt 
sense that others should be responsible, should help ‘share the burden’ (of freedom). 
When the burden of freedom is not shared, calls for help can take an accusatory tone, 
one that, perversely (and unsurprisingly), only seems to repel others from coming to 
the assistance of the diligent: 
why would I attend a meeting to be told off about what a shit activist I am? If they 
just emailed and said, look we really need some help then I'd be more responsive.  
(AN, Kebele, June 2010) 
That particular meeting turned out not quite to be the ‘telling off’ this non-
participant feared. However, 
despite my attempts [as facilitator] to keep things lively, it was one of the most tense, 
awkward and slow meetings I’ve been to for a while. It felt like certain individuals 
who felt ‘burnt-out’ by the process, were projecting that feeling onto the meeting - 
slowing things down that could move faster, over-complicating issues – to allow 
others to ‘share their pain’. The meeting actually finished early, but not content to 
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leave it on a high, two meeting stalwarts searched for an issue to fill the time with, 
and duly discussed it in spite of the evident low collective energy.   
(Fieldnotes, July 2010) 
In this ironic reversal, participation is at once framed as liberating, yet is experienced 
as an oppressive moral imperative that should be adhered to in spite of seemingly 
more immediate desires. This obscures the possibility that a sense of liberation may 
also be felt in not having to decide, especially so in situations of high trust. By 
framing participation as an individual obligation, and through the rigid adherence to 
process (like meeting length), a purportedly emancipatory process comes to feel like 
a burden. Freedom here functions as a mode of governing selves through disciplined 
participation. This self-government necessarily implies the government of others: the 
performance of responsible participation renders non-participants deviant or unfree 
(Rimke and Brock 2011: 195). 
 The framing of freedom as coextensive with the realization of rational selfhood is  
also productive of a particular work ethic. Rational analysis of a purportedly given 
situation defines a problem for which a response is required and a particular form of 
action – direct, visible, material – is privileged as the appropriate response. To the 
rational anarchist the world is ‘rendered technical’ (Li 2007, 2007a). This is signalled 
clearly in the term ‘activist’. Action, output and productivity tend to be what is 
valued over forms of immaterial labour like care and reflection (Heckert 2012; 
Shukaitis 2009). Where governmentality scholarship has called attention to the 
production of ‘active’ consumer subjects in a range of social spheres (Rose 1999: 166, 
178) here we see a mirror of this dynamic in the production of ‘active’ anti-capitalist 
subjects. Privileging action and activity as the marker of liberated subjectivity, 
imbues those participants who are able to perform socially sanctioned ‘action’ with 
the respect of peers and informal power over those less disposed to act similarly. 
Jane: The people who have left the Factory recently have been those lacking the 
privilege of ‘good mental health’ 
Me:  You’re right, I guess in these intensely socially interactive spaces it can be 
really tough to be unwell – what if you don't want to talk to anyone that day, 
to just be alone? 
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Jane: Yeah, I feel like there is a real lack of understanding, of compassion for people 
experiencing problems because of the culture of ‘getting shit done’ – some 
people don't realise that just getting up in the morning is a real struggle if 
you’re depressed and the socially imposed guilt for not being as productive as 
others in the space can make you feel worse, less valued, deviant in a space 
where we are supposed to be deviant.  
(Fieldnotes, September 2012) 
Herein lies a key tension of anarchist prefigurative spaces. They seek, on the one 
hand, to actively challenge the impending world of domination beyond their doors, a 
task conceived in epic proportions requiring all efforts by all people right now, yet at 
the same time to prefigure a more caring, restful and frivolous alterity in which 
human value is not determined by output. While prefigurative spaces neither 
straightforwardly reproduce nor ever exist fully outside of hegemonic norms 
(Cooper 2007), as research on queer prefigurative spaces and normativities has 
shown, the process of normalisation is often quick to (re-)establish itself (Brown 2012: 
208; Portwood-Stacer 2012; Rouhani 2012). At Kebele and the Factory, all too often 
the work ethic we claimed to rise against was recreated in attempts to prefigure 
alternatives. Living in accordance with this ethic, individuals performed a socially 
recognised form of liberated subjectivity, while those that failed to conform risked 
exclusion or were excluded. ‘Participation’s claim to inclusivity then acts to exclude 
and delegitimise those who decline to participate’ (Kesby 2005: 2042). 
Sometimes it feels like all we have to offer is complaints, critique, negative analyses, 
like we’re telling people that anything remotely fun or enjoyable is bad 
(Participant, ‘Cake or Death’ Discussion, The Factory, January 2011) 
The productivity work ethic is compounded by the acerbic culture of critique in 
radical spaces. Critique is a key strength of emancipatory social movements,  
relentlessly calling attention to the gaps between aspiration and practice, and often 
opening new spaces for becoming (Eisenstadt 2016). But when self-consciously 
demanding the impossible  - as anarchists do - critique can produce a continual and 
exhausting sense of failure especially when it questions practices while taking aims 
for granted. At the Factory, this kind of instrumental yet unending critique was so 
prevalent that it left little space for reflection on what worked. This cultivated a 
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cynicism towards experimentation and, perversely, a reinscription of the morally-
loaded productivity work ethic: “We just need to do the same thing better, harder, 
faster, more efficiently and we can’t celebrate success because there’s a long way still 
to go”. 
One area to which this form of criticism was persistently directed was the Factory’s 
largely ‘failed’ goal to ‘reach out’ to a mythical community we sought to serve. In our 
obsession with this perceived failing we refused to recognize our success in the 
creation of a well used, functioning, albeit predominantly anarchist, resource centre. 
This does not mean we should demand the possible or avoid self-criticism,  but 
simply that we should make space for recognition of the unintended positive 
consequences of demanding the impossible in order to provide the affective 
sustenance to keep going. 
The question of the participation of an other, discursively represented by the figure 
of ‘the community’, was a persistent theme in reflective discussions within both 
spaces and is a common concern for social centres more widely (Chatterton 2010: 
1215-18). In early discussions prior to occupying the Factory, ‘community’ was 
understood quite critically: ‘the community’ was once struck off a leaflet outlining 
who the Factory aimed to serve, on the grounds that the term ‘has already been co-
opted by neo-Labour’ (Space Invaders Meeting, December 2009). Nonetheless, the 
aim of ‘community outreach’ returned and returned in weekly meetings. Critiques of 
concepts do not always have a lasting effect on actual practices (Rouhani 2012).  
In seeking to understand why others did not take part, or might want to use the 
spaces in ways that exempt them from decision-making, explanations offered 
included: the white-dominance, gender-dynamics and physical accessibility of the 
spaces; the allegedly ‘off-putting’ aesthetic qualities like the colour of the walls, the 
tattoos or asymmetric haircuts of other participant and the font, imagery and 
wording used in flyers and posters. Some argued that if only the community were 
better informed, if only the impositions of the media, work, schooling and other 
forms of social control were ‘thrown off’ they would join us. Some suggested that 
non-participants are working too hard just to survive right now and therefore don't 
have time. A few suggested they may be resisting in other ways. Mahmood 
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highlights a parallel way of accounting for the Other in Western Feminist accounts of 
women’s Islamic piety movements (2012 [2005]: 5-15).  Seeking to understand 
participation in activities they see as non-liberating, Western Feminism, Mahmood 
argues cites three possible explanations: (1.) false consciousness – women are tricked 
by the ‘the system’; (2.) the necessity of survival - they have objective material 
interests [which we define]; or (3.) covert resistance – they are resisting in ways we 
are unaware of. Embedded in this thinking is the assumption that freedom as we 
define it is the fulcrum of human fulfilment – it therefore follows that all humans 
should want to pursue our vision of liberation. Notable here is the ‘should’. As White 
and Hunt argue, the liberal notion of freedom not only ‘provide[s] the capacity to 
choose, it also requires that we have to choose; this is the paradox of freedom’ (White 
and hunt 2000: 108 my emphasis). Or as Rasmussen argues, ‘the demand that we be 
allowed to self-govern is also a command that we do so’ (Rasmussen 2011: xv). The 
subject of freedom is then transformed into a subject of obligation driven not by 
desire to take control of one’s life but by duty that one should. 
It feels like we’re treating 'public' involvement like a company would their target 
market – we want to attract them to our uniquely positioned product in the present 
social context – like the pound stores that open in a recession we aim to strike when 
times are hard. It’s too one sided  – it’s always about getting ‘them’ to come to ‘us’. 
(Fieldnotes, October 2009) 
Joseph argues that the appeal of ‘community’ in popular discourse is that it seems to 
offer resistance to assimilation, modernisation, and capital penetration as a source of 
authentic, pre-capitalist, and/or anti-capitalist social relations (2002). At Kebele and 
the Factory, the desire to include ‘the community’ certainly drew legitimacy from 
these positive associations. However, where Joseph analyses the use of ‘community’ 
to refer to identity-bound collectivities (and their exclusionary effects), ‘the 
community’, for Kebele and Factory participants, refers to an undifferentiated mass, 
an other that is anyone but ‘us’. The heterogeneity of community is thus collapsed, 
while the specificity of our own grouping (disproportionately white, highly educated 
and young) is erased (Thompson 2010).  ‘We’ are positioned as ‘normal’, as the 
embodiment of a universal standard of humanness, while ‘they’ represent the ‘local’, 
the specific, the ‘return’ to an ‘authentic’ form of social connection. ‘Community’ is 
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that which we desire to attract, yet simultaneously represents a backwardness in a 
lineage of progress where social centres are the bright future. 
~ 
In a conflict resolution workshop at the Factory in 2011, facilitators shared a common 
technique for reflection on a perceived grievance by which the subject is urged to 
consider her own needs in a given situation involving conflict. ‘Need’ here does not 
necessarily refer solely to objective, material requirements for life but also to 
emotional and/or psychological ones. It includes, therefore, what might be thought 
of from a purely rationalist perspective as ‘desires’. In the workshop, mainly 
attended by self-identifying ‘activists’, it was immediately alarming how difficult it 
was for participants to articulate their ‘needs’ – material or otherwise, particularly in 
relation to their activism. Articulating ‘own’ need or desire – for connection, to be 
involved in a particular form of organising, to be part of a supportive group or to 
live a particular way of life – seemed to be taboo. Instead the over-riding norm was 
to frame action in terms of some kind of moral obligation based on a rational analysis 
of a purportedly given situation. This concealment, or lack of awareness of 
individual needs behind the assumed needs of others is productive of a problematic 
dynamic: on the one hand of burn-out through ascetic self-denial and pressure to 
work harder for them; on the other, of paternalistic relations of benevolence towards 
those attempt to save. 
Freedom as the Liberation of Desire 
The activist uses moral coercion and guilt to wield power over others less 
experienced in the theology of suffering. Their subordination of themselves 
goes hand in hand with their subordination of others – all enslaved to ‘the 
cause’. Self-sacrificing politicos stunt their own lives and their own will to 
live [...] the partisans of absolute self-sacrifice. (Andrew X, 1999). 
Reaction to the self-oppressive character of forms of social action based around 
instrumental rationalities is put in fewer places more forcefully than in Andrew X’s 
polemic critique, Give Up Activism (1999). This was the first text read at the Factory 
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reading group. In this piece, moral obligation is lambasted on the grounds that it 
constitutes a form of coercion, outside and against the desiring subject. For Andrew 
X, the activist is an ascetic whose practices of self-discipline, denial and virtuous 
hard work lead far from the path of liberation.  
The Situationist critique of the pre-‘68 left as lifeless, duty-bound, ascetic and 
tactically unimaginative, resonated profoundly with individualist, post-, drop-out 
and modifier-refusing anarchisms of the 1990s, Andrew X being no exception.  
Black’s (1997) Anarchy After Leftism called on anarchists to abandon failed and 
outmoded 19th Century tactics, and their commitment to enlightenment humanism. 
Provocatively expressing the critique of rationalist revolutionary duty, Bey's 
Temporary Autonomous Zone (1991) called forth a nomadic, desiring subject 
untethered by the imposition of ‘externally imposed’ morality. A decade later, 
CrimethInc (2001), alongside innumerable authors of self published ‘zines’ and 
articles, pushed this desiring nomadism forward, proposing a similar praxis of lived 
negation of capitalist, white supremacist, patriarchal and other hierarchical social 
relations and subjectivities (see, Lyle 2010; Lockdown 2011). Organising the masses 
and actively attempting to encourage participation in large-scale collective projects, 
even ‘community organising’, are often understood here as inherently authoritarian 
as well as self-oppressive endeavours. Instead, critics propose lives of liminality, 
crime, squatting, skip-diving, shoplifting, and scams alongside permaculture 
gardening and DIY, as well as a provocative attack on perceived sites of power 
through insurrectionist acts of creative destruction – property destruction, arson (see, 
325.nostate.net) and acts of ‘performative violence’ (Juris 2005).  
This Situationist-inspired, post-modern-dropout, insurrectionist, and anti-
organisationalist current resonated deeply within the Factory. Many of us had 
recently come through, or were still participating in Bristol’s illegal rave scene and 
the squatted Temporary Autonomous Art exhibitions that formed part of Bristol’s 
intersecting art, party and protest subcultures. Bey’s ‘poetic terrorism’ seemed to 
speak to these practices and struck a chord with our prior involvement in temporary 
autonomous zones as Bristol Space Invaders. Though CrimethInc’s seductive poetics 
were often the subject of parody – ‘wow man, that’s so CrimethInc – wanna go make love 
in dumpster?’ – the life of liminality they described was very close to that of many 
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residents and their texts were among the most widely thumbed. Andrew X’s ‘Give 
up Activism’ was the first of many texts to be read at the Factory reading group and 
the info-shop and zine library were composed predominantly of insurrectionist and 
broadly anti-organisationalist texts. Whether or not acts like those endorsed on those 
pages – or on the posters of burning cop cars and post-apocalyptic-cum-
revolutionary scenes that decorated the walls – were ever carried out, their presence 
served as endorsement of a form of freedom honouring desire and eschewing moral 
duty. 
The desiring subject was not only performed and presupposed through personalised 
practices like sourcing food and creating housing through squatting – but also 
through an approach to collective working that aimed to avoid forms of organisation 
that were experienced as too rigidly structured. Where Kebele had tended to codify 
working practices to ensure quality and equality, the Factory aimed to facilitate a 
greater degree of spontaneous and individually differentiated forms of action. 
At the Factory, having a rota would be counter-productive – only people who are 
comfortable with this level commitment would put their names down and most object 
on principle anyway – a rota would just annoy the ‘rota-happy-people’ since reading 
it would seem like it was only them doing the work. This would create a sense of 
misplaced injustice since it's not that those unhappy with the rota wouldn't do the 
work, but that they would desire not to be pinned down to a task at a point in the 
future, and instead prefer do it when they feel like it. 
(Fieldnotes February 2011) 
Here we see quite a different form of liberated subjectivity from the rational subject 
of consensus – the desiring subject is committed to collective action but actively 
resists all impositions and obligations to act. This mode of freedom privileges the 
sovereignty of immediate desire over the sovereignty of the rational will. The 
attempt here is to cultivate a life-praxis where motivation comes from present desire 
as opposed to a prior obligation.  
 
If I get up this morning and want to build a staircase over there, that’s what I’ll do – 
that’s one of the great things about this space – you can basically do what you want 
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so long as it contributes to the project  – and we don’t have to wait for the weekly 
meeting to do it, we’re not so tied down with endless over-organising that just puts 
people off (KG, Fieldnotes September 2012). 
Amenability to spontaneity is in part produced by the materiality of the space, in 
part by the position of relative privilege inhabited by individual participants and in 
part by active decisions participants make about their lives. The state of disrepair in 
which we found the building meant that on a given day there were a multitude of 
evident repairs ‘in need’ of attention. Virtually anything you set your efforts to 
would be an improvement and appreciated by others. ‘Just doing it’ was therefore 
prioritised over awaiting consensus in lengthy decision-making processes. 
Occasionally a participant might remark that the actions of another may not have 
been the most pressing task, but rarely would anyone prohibit another from doing 
something unless it clearly conflicted with the implicit principles of the space or an 
existing plan set out in the weekly meeting. Even then, such transgressions did occur 
and usually with minimal to zero repercussions. 
More spontaneous forms of organising and action are also facilitated by life-positions 
that are in some way chosen. Unlike Kebele, most Factory participants are squatters 
and very few work full-time or have children or other major time-commitments. Life 
for most was simply more amenable to spontaneous action, be it attending a 
demonstration, responding to a call to defend an eviction, or simply to stop and talk, 
cook food, or fix a leaky roof.  Choosing a life of fewer constraints and making a 
commitment to work against the imposition of new ones was for many an active life-
practice. This was productive of a form of liberated self-hood in accordance with a 
view of freedom as the amenability to sense and act from more immediate desires.  
This is not unproblematic. Such a framework implies that those who have actively 
chosen a life of liminality instead of having had it forced upon them are in some 
sense ‘freer’ – since this life is their desire. This privileges those from more stable and 
middle-class backgrounds in the attainment of insider-status. Similarly, spontaneous 
action outside of a collective process, whilst offering a particular sense of liberation 
to some, is not necessarily experienced by, or indeed amenable to all, equally. The 
participant, KG, quoted above, is a key member of the group, elevated in the 
informal hierarchy as a productive, dynamic, confident and articulate white male. He 
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feels able to do what he wants, liberated from a ‘restrictive’ process. Others with 
whom I spoke, both residents and non-resident-participants, felt less able to embark 
on any project they wished to, were less clear about what needed doing, and more 
fearful of critique or negative feedback. Citing such problems, new volunteers often 
disappeared, and, as the project endured, the number of non-resident participants 
dwindled. The ability to act confidently and know what ‘needs’ to be done (or what 
others in the group will likely regard as useful) relies in a large part on insider status, 
a status which is not exclusive to, but is certainly more easily accessed by, those with 
particular social privileges.   
The notion of freedom as coextensive with sovereignty of the desiring subject is 
draws explicitly on the work of Max Stirner, who commonly is referenced in the 
post-leftist anarchism of Bey (1991), Black (1997) and the anarchist-individualist and 
egoist writings (Landstreicher 2009, n.d.; Enemies of Society 2011) that have become 
popular within the insurrectionist and anti-organisationalist milieus that populate 
the Factory. Newman’s post-anarchism draws on Stirner when he argues that ‘[f]or 
freedom to have any value it must be based on the power of the individual to create 
it’. Citing Stirner directly, Newman argues that, 
[m]y freedom becomes complete only when it is my--might; but by this I cease 
to be a merely free man and become my own man (Stirner 1995: 151 cited in 
Newman 2003: 19). 
Here ‘free man’ refers to the liberal subject of freedom – autonomous rational man. 
For Stirner, ‘the state betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man’ – that 
is, in pre-defining subjectivity with the moral imperatives and individual-state 
relationships that the subject position ‘man’ entails. Freedom is not to be found in 
becoming subject to the state, rationality or any idea, institution or individual other 
than oneself. Stirner thus rejects the notion of freedom as coextensive with rational 
subjectivity and the claim therein that rationality is universally embedded in all 
subjects. In doing so, he provides an antidote to the latent rationalism and attendant 
moral obligation bound up in much anarchist praxis. 
However, Stirner’s concept of ‘ownness’ is so pure as to present a vision of the 
individual as feasibly sovereign. Sovereign agency is not only epistemologically 
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suspect – implying that is possible to fully disentangle oneself from the webs of 
connection through which selves emerge – it also entails the re-inscription of a binary 
between the subject and power. Unlike the humanist subject, the sovereign self is 
empty of content and thus avoids a particular form of essentialism (and its 
oppressive effects). However, if the subject is pure, power remains its ‘constitutive 
outside’ – a corrupting outside influence (which itself implies a benign essence) 
rather than something through which subjects emerge. This is potentially harmful – 
if we fail to see power-laden practices as productive of subjects, we will lack the 
analytical tools to expose the disciplinary and, in some cases, oppressive effects of 
particular modes of subject formation (like the call to sovereign subjectivity) – we 
lack the ability to differentiate between more liberating and more oppressive modes 
of subjectifcation (Eisenstadt 2016). 
Ironically it is precisely this binary between the subject and power that Newman’s 
post-anarchist engagement with Stirner seeks to avoid. While Stirner may have 
proposed something more subtle than the pure sovereign self, this is how he has 
largely been understood by individualist and insurrectionist anarchists. As Meme 
writes in the introduction to a 2011 anthology of egoist and anarchist individualist 
writing that circulated at the Factory,  
Nothing more, nothing less is postulated within [Stirner’s] The Ego And His 
Own than the absolute sovereignty of the individual in the face of all attempts 
at his/her weakening and suppression (Meme 2011: xvi). 
From this perspective, anything deemed to be ‘outside’ the individual, is necessarily 
a suppression of that individual, be those concepts or ‘spooks’ like rational man or 
human nature, or the desires or wishes of another. While this acts as a potent critique 
of the way in which liberalism attempts to position the definition and characteristics 
of ‘free man’ beyond contestation, it ends in a disavowal of the call of another – 
altruism, the response to the call of another - is seen as a form of self-oppression. The 
collective here is thought of as inherently repressive of and diametrically opposed to 
the sovereign self. Perversely, this purist account of the individual/collective tension 
re-produces a ‘spook’ in the totalizing figure of the individual, which in turn draws 




 The individualist position does powerfully address a set of problems with rational 
subjectivity. Its suspicion of altruism is useful for the critique of self-sacrifice in 
activism to the extent that it forces the reflective subject to question ‘own’ motives 
and desires and to recognise the ways in which acts ‘for others’ are also acts ‘for 
ourselves’. There is here a potent critique of the disciplinarity of collective process 
through the production of norms and modes of organising perceived to be 
excessively rigid.  Additionally, individualist critique draws attention to the extent to 
which governance, indeed domination, is made possible through the acquiescence 
and, in certain cases, cultivated desire on the part of the subject to be governed or 
dominated. 
Ideological anarchists don’t like to hear this but the state continues to exist, 
not solely by violent conquest or deception but because there is a demand for 
its services from the sheep habituated to governance (Meme 2011: xiii). 
However, as this quote demonstrates, there is often a patronising edge to this insight 
that sets apart the ‘dominated mass’ from the ‘enlightened individualist’. For the 
militant individualist ‘to make my freedom conditional upon the freedom of others is 
to turn me into their servant’ (ibid: xvi). Viewing any curtailment of action as a form 
of servitude only really makes sense from the viewpoint of the highly privileged 
individual . From the perspective of those with less privilege, what the individualist 
sees as curtailment could instead be experienced as emancipatory. Within the looser 
organising practices at the Factory, those participants that tended to feel individually 
liberated from a restrictive process were often ‘key’ members, elevated in the 
informal hierarchies though access to intersecting privileges . For those without 
insider status, clearer process can facilitate freer and more equal participation if so 
desired. From the individualist perspective those desiring a clearer process would 
either be deluded ‘sheep’ desirous of their own oppression (since their freedom 
would entail collective limitation) or be lying about their ‘true’ desires for non-
limitation. Thus, and mirroring the rationalist inability to countenance the lack of 
desire for participation, one specific form of freedom, is presented as 
universal/innate and is duly imposed on others such that they are rendered stupid, 
liars or non-human if they do not desire it. This Stirner-influenced anarchism is faced 
with two options: a naïve belief in the benevolence of human nature such that when 
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all restrictions are removed humans will naturally cooperate regardless of power 
imbalances, or alternatively, a nihilism in which the strong dominating the weak 
does not matter, everything is legitimate as the liberation of ‘own’ desire. 
Paradoxically, and again mirroring rational subjectivity, desiring subjectivity also 
entails oppressive effects for the individual subject of freedom. If liberation is the 
access to and unrestricted fulfilment of individual desire, what it means to be free is 
severely curtailed. The individual is trapped in an endless quest to discover and sate 
‘true’ desire, never experiencing the liberating feeling of letting go, of not having to 
win or choose or of those joys, desires, connections that emerge between subjects and 
sometimes exceed them. 
 
Sovereignty or Sovereignty – It’s Your Choice 
Whether freedom is constituted by knowing and acting on the rational will or ‘own’ 
desire, liberation remains coextensive with sovereign subjectivity. This popular 
framing makes intuitive sense from within the normative discourses that frame 
anarchist social centres. In a world of oppressive social norms, seductive advertising, 
ubiquitous surveillance and laws backed by punitive sanctions, liberation is 
experienced in the ‘stripping away of the layers of control’ in search of a pure un-
corrupted self. However, as poststructuralist critics have argued, there is no ‘pure 
uncorrupted’ self beneath these layers (cf. Butler 2005). Wills and desires are never 
wholly ours, but rather co-emerge in the always-already social settings though which 
we become. 
Sometimes events exceed our conscious aspirations – when a march breaks free of a 
prescribed route and we run through the streets (CrimethInc 2012b) or when a 
conversation at a bus-stop bus makes a connection across difference we had never 
imagined. We did not desire these experiences previously, we did not rationally 
consent – they emerged through us in specific contexts with others. There is agency 




This observation may seem obvious, but it strikes a fundamental discord with the 
prevailing orthodoxy of anarchist thought and practice at the Factory, at Kebele and 
in influential movement literatures. From this perspective, the co-emergence of 
desire, or wills, constitutes a form of oppression, as do forms of self-discipline that 
aim to account for the freedom of the other. 
In positing a pure self, we reinscribe a binary between the subject and power. The 
irony here is that both accounts are discourses of empowerment, but power is seen as 
a commodity to be ‘taken back’ by the individual or ‘re-distributed’ by the collective. 
This produces a ‘blind-spot’ to the ways in which subjects are constituted or formed 
through practices of power. This ‘constitutive character’ of power is not inherently 
oppressive, but unless we are able to analyse it, we are unable to differentiate 
between dominating and non-dominating practices of liberated subject-formation. 
Unless we understand anarchist practices of freedom as governmental, then we will 
be unable to think and practice more emancipatory modes of governing. The 
question for anarchists, and for anyone desiring freedom with social equality, is how 
we differentiate between these governmental techniques that foster individuality at 
the expense of equality, and those practices of self-cultivation that work to enhance 
it. 
In order to begin to answer this we need to think of freedom and discipline as 
mutually constituted – to look to the ways in which practices of self-discipline that 
are required to cultivate egalitarian relations with others might be liberating for the 
subject. Secondly, we need to see subjects as mutually constituted – to discard the 
sovereign subject as the fulcrum of human liberation and instead to think of freedom 
in a context in which subjects and selves overlap and agency is never pure. This is 
profoundly troubling for anarchist thought – what would such a liberation look like 
and how could we know when we had found it? This is our challenge. 
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